Abstract The science of emotion is in a crisis: despite an enormous literature studying emotion from the perspectives of psychology and neuroscience, there is little agreement on any theory of emotion. The most acute problem is that our commonsense concept of "emotion" essentially involves conscious experience, whereas the scientific concept should not. I suggest that this state of affairs is, however, no different than in any other domain of cognitive psychology or cognitive neuroscience. Numerous examples show the need for a scientific concept of emotion. Both psychological and neurological data require such a concept in order to make sense of the data. I argue that (a) we cannot dispense with a scientific concept of "emotion"; and (b) such a concept needs to be grounded in broad data across a range of species; and (c) we need to begin formulating specific criteria for its application. In this paper I begin by outlining what the problem is, give some examples from my own research, and conclude with a framework for thinking about emotions that gives them scientific purchase.
Introduction: Problems with the science of emotion
The science of emotion faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it seems apparent that all animals (including humans) have emotions, as Charles Darwin already observed well over 100 years ago (Darwin, 1872 (Darwin, /1965 . On the other hand, it has proven elusive to produce a common set of criteria for how to determine whether an animal has an emotion, and how to understand what this is. Similarly, the person on the street has no doubt that people can be angry, afraid, sad, happy, and many other emotions; yet scientists show little agreement on how to interpret these commonsense claims.
Indeed, a recent review paper asked various emotion scientists to explain what they mean by the word "emotion", and obtained little consensus: 26 scientists disagreed significantly with one another, leading the authors to conclude that, "Emotion can be treated as a non-technical chapter title but given no serious scientific work to do.....the science of emotion should no longer use "emotion" as a scientific term." (Widen & Russell, 2010) It was the researcher Joe LeDoux who put his finger on the main reason for these disagreements (although not the only one): the role of conscious experience. That is, our commonsense concept of emotion refers to the conscious experience of an emotion, to feelings. While we know that we have feelings, through introspection and from verbal report, we cannot know whether nonhuman animals have feelings, LeDoux argues. Hence we should stop using the word "emotion" when studying animals. (LeDoux, 2012) I think that this is the most serious problem for emotion research, how to accommodate conscious experience of emotions in animal studies without anthropomorphizing. Charles Darwin himself was guilty of doing so -in his book he notes the behavioral similarities between emotional expressions in humans, and expressions in other animals. Darwin believed that he could tell what emotion an animal had from observing its behavior, and pet owners have the same conviction. In both cases they are anthropomorphizing to some extent, and the inference that animals experience specific emotions may not be warranted (on the other hand, it cannot be completely wrong, otherwise social communication would be impossible).
This then is one of the clearest formulations of a specific problem with a scientific concept of emotion. If the concept is similar to the folk concept, it will make the conscious experience of emotions an essential ingredient, yet it seems clear that there can be emotional processing in the brain that is not necessarily accompanied by conscious experience, and we lack agreed criteria for attributing conscious experiences to nonhuman animals. One conclusion from this dilemma is to stop using the word "emotion" in scientific discourse, which LeDoux has in fact advocated (LeDoux, 2012) .
I think that these conclusions are wrong. The premisses seem right, but the argument fails because it considers only one way to reconcile the situation. Roughly, the argument is this:
1. Our scientific concept of "emotion", especially as studied in nonhuman animals, should not imply conscious experiences.
2. Our folk concept of "emotion" necessarily includes conscious experiences.
3. Therefore we should not use the word "emotion" as scientists and leave it just for folk useage.
To see why this argument cannot be right, consider how it would apply to any other psychological state that we investigate in animals. Take vision. If you poll nonscientists on the street and ask them what they mean by the word "vision", they will tell you that their concept of vision includes the conscious experience of seeing. If you ask most vision scientists, they will say they are studying circuits in the retina, or color discrimination in a fish, or motion detection in the monkey. In none of these cases do they claim necessarily to be studying conscious experience. Take a second example: memory. The person on the street thinks of memory as the conscious recollection of past events. Psychologists have long known that many types of memory do not involve conscious experience at all.
One could come up with many more such examples, but the lesson seems clear: our folk concepts of psychological states are inevitably bound up with our concept of consciousness. This is why Freud's theory of the mind was such a huge event: it first introduced the idea of an unconscious mind, albeit in a very particular theory. Since Freud, psychology and neuroscience have made it clear that much of cognition does not involve conscious experience; indeed, most scientists would now agree that the mind is mostly unconscious. This shows that there is a big difference between our folk concept of the mind, and how psychologists and neuroscientists think of the mind: the person on the street thinks about consciousness, whereas most scientists do not (or at least, not necessarily).
Given the generality of this fact, as borne out also by the examples from vision and memory I gave above, it seems unwarranted to engage step 3 in the argument about emotion above. Why not do the same thing with a science of emotion as we have done with a science of vision, and with a science of memory. To reconcile folk and scientific concepts, don't get rid of the word "emotion" in science, but change its meaning. There are all kinds of examples where words are used with somewhat different meanings when used colloquially, and when used in science. In scientific useage, "emotion" simply should not necessarily refer to the conscious experience of emotion. In fact, I will argue below that the conscious experience of emotion should be thought of as a consequence of an emotion state, not as its cause or as part of its constitution. Curiously, Joe LeDoux himself already said as much in a paper over 20 years ago! (LeDoux, 1994) There are two primary motivations for using the term "emotion" in our study of animal psychology. The first, as noted above, is that it should be possible to retain those aspects of "emotion" that are not part of the conscious experience and still describe behaviors, just as we have done with vision and memory. The second, related, motivation is that "emotion" is in fact a concept that is indispensable for explaining animal behavior. It is not an option to delete it from our vocabulary if we wish to have a strongly explanatory psychology. In the rest of this paper I provide some key examples of emotion research that shows the usefulness of a scientific concept of emotion, and I suggest some of the criteria for how we should operationalize such a concept to move forward. I should note that this, of course, does not resolve all the debates about "emotion" and many important and difficult issues remain: it remains difficult to articulate the distinction between emotions, moods, and other states; it remains difficult to say exactly how many varieties of emotions there are and how they should be distinguished. And in the end it remains difficult to explain how conscious experiences of emotions arise -but, as I see it, this difficulty is no greater than for explaining how conscious visual experiences arise. There is a lot of work to be done, but we need to set out with a clear concept of emotion, generically, that allows psychologists and neuroscientists to do this work.
Three Examples
Before discussing the conceptual issues, I will give three brief examples that, I hope, show some promising directions with empirical work. All three are published stories, and they are intended to buttress the claim that we need the word "emotion" in our scientific understanding of the brain and mind.
Perceiving Emotions in Others
One of the most influential, and most debated, modern theories of emotion is Paul Ekman's theory of basic emotions. Taking his cue from Darwin, Ekman proposes that humans have phylogenetically conserved programs, implemented in the brain, for specific emotions (what he calls "basic emotions") (Ekman, 1992a) . Several aspects of this theory are important: first, it proposes universal emotions that are continuous with those in other animals; second it conceives of these emotions as resembling a reflex-like "program" in terms of the neurobiological processing (an issue we will return to below), and third, it acknowledges that there may be other, more culturally idiosyncratic emotions, that are not "basic". The latter issue has been developed in detail by the philosopher Paul Griffiths and is also noted further below (Griffiths, 1997 ).
Ekman's research on basic emotions focuses on people's ability to recognize emotions from particular scenarios and circumstances, and, specifically, from facial expressions (Ekman, 1992b (Ekman, , 1994 . This approach has spawned a very large body of work in the psychology of emotion (Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 1997) , and more recently also the neuroscience of emotion (Adolphs, 2002) , which has used facial expressions of emotions as the stimuli. In a sense, this line of work avoids the thorny issue of conscious experience by focusing on recognition and categorization of emotions, rather than their conscious experience. Of course, participants in such studies may very well be attributing conscious experiences of emotions to the people whose facial expressions they are shown as stimuli -but the investigation is about the perception of those stimuli, not about the people shown in the photographs. (Although there is a further complication in that some theories propose that the viewers figure out the emotion shown on the face by "simulating" the emotion, and thus may indeed consciously experience the emotion as one strategy to recognize it).
Recognition of emotion is an aspect of social communication, a function for emotional behaviors that Darwin referred to as "serviceable associated habits" -that is, the expression itself may only vestigially reflect its original adaptive functioning in the world (e.g., avoiding danger, attacking, etc.), but those behaviors have been co-opted into a social communicative function, at least in part, in most higher animals. This is not to say that we cannot tell some story still about the non-social adaptive functions of emotional expressions, and indeed some functional accounts have been provided in recent studies (Susskind et al., 2008) .
Emotion recognition has become a topic in cognitive neuroscience as well, ever since the discovery that rather specific brain regions appear to be necessary for the recognition of rather specific emotional expressions. Specifically, the amygdala is involved in recognizing facial expressions of fear, and parts of the basal ganglia appear to be important for recognizing disgust (Calder et al., 2001) . Lesions in these regions can cause dramatic impairments in recognizing those specific emotions. In the case of the amygdala, this has been studied in rare patients with bilateral lesions of the amygdala, who can show a remarkably selective impairment in recognizing fear, with normal ability to recognize other emotions. What is particularly important for our purposes is that recognition of the emotion from the face can be double dissociated from recognition of other information from the face, such as recognizing the identity of a familiar person (Adolphs et al., 1994; Calder & Young, 2005; Tranel et al., 1988) . Such double-dissociations have classically been taken to demonstrate separable neural systems, and so there is strong evidence for at least some specialization in the human brain for processing emotional facial expressions. At least in this perceptual capacity, then, one would want to use the term "emotion" to refer to that aspect of social displays that is distinct from identification or gender recognition.
Emotion modulates Attention
But of course emotion is more than merely in the eye of the beholder -yet measuring the movement of our eyes, we can gain insight into one primary function of emotion beyond its behavioral expression. That is how emotion influences attention. For emotions to be conceived of as central states, as we will elaborate below, they must not only play a causal role in behavior, but they must interface with the rest of cognition. That is, emotions must interact with processes such as a learning and memory, decision-making, perception, and attention. One of the clearest examples of this presents stimuli that vary in their emotional meaning, and asks how this influences aspects of attention. Such studies have long shown that highly emotional material is encoded preferentially into longterm memory: people remember those events in their lives that have the greatest emotional content, probably accounting also for the "bump" in autobiographical memory that is seen around the time of teenagehood into early adulthood, when many emotional events happen in people's lives (going away from home, getting married, getting a job, etc.) (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997) . Similarly, emotion exerts a strong influence on attention. When streams of words are shown rapidly after one another, in a so-called rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) protocol, people's ability to detect a second stimulus right after a first one has been detected is normally diminished, a phenomenon termed the "attentional blink". That is, when seeing the words, "rain, flower, rock, table, car,chair....." in quick succession, and asked to detect the word "rock", people's ability to detect the following word ("table" in our example) is normally diminished. This effect, however, can be overcome if the following word is emotional. For instance, given the stream, "rain, flower, rock, death, car,chair.....", people will be now able to detect "death" after having detected "rock", because the highly emotional meaning of "death" overcomes the attentional blink .
There are many other examples of how the emotional meaning of stimuli makes them salient and assigns attentional priority. Perhaps most interesting for our purposes are experiments also showing such effects when the emotional stimuli are presented subliminally. That is, the emotional meaning of stimuli can be evaluated, at least to some degree, even when the stimuli cannot be consciously perceived. In one study, sexually explicit pictures were shown subliminally (pictures of naked men or women), and this enhanced people's ability to discriminate subsequent stimuli shown at the same spatial location. That is, subliminal (unseen) emotional stimuli had an effect on spatial attention. In that study, there was also a relationship between the sexual orientation of the viewer and the potency of this effect, showing that it clearly derives from the emotional meaning that the subliminal pictures have for that individual, rather than some basic sensory properties (which should be the same for everyone) (Jiang et al., 2006) .
Once again, the amygdala is a brain structure prominently linked to this theme. Lesions of the amygdala in humans do not only result in deficits in recognizing fearful facial expressions, but more broadly influence the processing of a variety of sensory cues related to threat and danger. For instance, highly emotional stimuli are not encoded preferentially into long-term memory (McGaugh, 2004) , and threatening emotion words do not gain priority over the attentional blink, when these experiments are done in patients with bilateral amygdala lesions (Anderson & Phelps, 2001 ). More than that, these attentional effects appear to explain at least some of the perceptual effects discussed in the previous section. A patient with bilateral amygdala lesions was impaired in recognizing facial expressions of fear, but this impairment turned out to result from this patient's abnormal visual attention to the face stimuli. She failed to fixate the eye region of the faces, which is normally the most informative region of the face for recognizing fear (Adolphs et al., 2005) (Figure 1 ).
The Experience of Emotion
To come full-circle with our last example, we consider the conscious experience of fear. In the same patient with bilateral amygdala lesions discussed earlier (Figure 1 ), we also carried out a study to probe her experience of fear (Feinstein et al., 2011) . Dependent measures included observed behavior, psychophysiological response, and verbal report. Across a range of experiments, there were two key findings. First, the patient was unable to have an experience of fear when we attempted to induce this with exteroceptive stimuli, be they emotional films, complex situations such as a haunted house, or large snakes and spiders. Nor did the patient report any episodes of fear experience in her everyday life, using experience sampling. Second, and by contrast, this same patient was, however, able to experience an acute state of panic when induced through an interoceptive stimulus, carbon dioxide inhalation (Feinstein et al., 2013) . This procedure briefly makes the blood acidic, which is sensed by pH sensors in several locations in the body, which in turn signal a state of possible suffocation to target regions in the brainstem. The experience is one of acute suffocation, so intense that it elicits a panic attack in about 20% of people.
The fact that patients with bilateral amygdala lesions can experience fear when induced by inhaling carbon dioxide, even though they cannot experience it through external sensory stimuli, demonstrates that the amygdala cannot be a brain structure essential to all experiences of fear. This drives home the message with which I began this paper: conscious experience of an emotion cannot be taken to be the same as "emotion", since there are just too many dissociations. There is no magical "essence" for emotion in terms of how emotions feel. Rather emotion, like vision or memory, is a functional concept and emotions are functional properties of organisms that draw on a wide range of processes, implemented by a wide range of brain structures.
Criteria for Emotion
The core criterion of an emotion is that it is a functional state. This means it is defined relationally: by how stimuli and context cause the emotion, and by how the emotion influences attention, memory, decision-making, and behavior. Emotions are functional states of organisms but, as psychologists and neuroscientists, we want to delimit their implementation so that we know where to look. In a recent paper with my colleague David Anderson at Caltech, we argued that emotions should be thought of, first and foremost, as central states of an organism, that is, states of the nervous system (Anderson & Adolphs, 2014) (Figure 2) . Distal stimuli and context provide inputs to such central states and set the scene for their interpretation, behavioral expressions of Figure 1 . The brain and face processing of patient SM. Bilateral amygdala lesions impair the use of the eyes and gaze to the eyes during emotion judgment. (A) A patient with bilateral damage to the amygdala made significantly less use of information from the eye region of faces when judging emotion. (B) While looking at whole faces, the patient (right column of images) exhibited abnormal face gaze, making far fewer fixations to the eyes than did controls (left column of images). This was observed across emotions (free viewing, emotion judgment, gender discrimination). (C) MRI scan of the patient's brain, whose lesion was relatively restricted to the entire amygdala, a very rare lesion in humans. The two round black regions near the top middle of the image are the lesioned amygdalae. (D) When the subject was instructed to look at the eyes ("SM eyes") in a whole face, she could do this, resulting in a remarkable recovery in ability to recognize the facial expression of fear. The findings show that an apparent role for the amygdala in processing fearful facial expressions is in fact more abstract, and involves the detection and attentional direction onto features that are socially informative. Reproduced with permission from (Adolphs, 2010). emotions provide some of the clearest evidence for them, and influences on attention and memory add further data than can be obtained by the scientist in the lab, and that is probably often used by the subject himself to assign an emotion. But what defines the emotion state is the coordination amongst all of these different components-a synchronized coordination long emphasized by psychological appraisal theories (Scherer, 2009) . Incidentally, this also makes the point that of course emotions are not static states, but rather collections of processes that unfold through time.
Thinking of emotions as central functional states probably sounds reasonable to many readers, but immediately poses the next question: this definition also fits for any other psychological state. What makes emotions different from thoughts, memories, attention, or perception? There are two possible answers here:
1. Emotions are functional states distinguished by their content. For instance, perhaps they are fundamentally about value and survival. Joe LeDoux has argued this route, in fact calling emotions "survival states" (LeDoux, 2012).
2.
Emotions are functional states distinguished by certain processing and architecture criteria rather than content. This is the argument David Anderson and I recently began to flesh out, coming up with a tentative list of criteria that might distinguish emotion states (Anderson & Adolphs, 2014) . That list is reproduced in Table 1 .
These two approaches are not mutually exclusive, of course. The question concerns their priority. In my view, emotions are functional states with particular computational properties (those listed in Table 1 for a beginning). And it is in virtue of those properties that they enable valuation and survival. Now, one could well ask what it is that ties all the functional properties listed in Table 1 together. Why cluster these particular properties into something called "emotion"? The answer is that this cluster of properties describes a particular, and particularly important, level in the control of behavior. The schematic illustrates the idea that emotions are central states, caused by stimuli, and in turn causing behavior, changes in cognition, and responses in the body. The induction of an emotion states is very context-dependent, and, at least in humans, also features volitional control, which can serve to regulate emotion at multiple stages of processing (e.g., (Gross, 2002) ). Reproduced from (Anderson & Adolphs, 2014 ).
There are several ways of viewing emotion's place amongst the multiple controllers of an animal's behavior. One dimension is simply complexity: emotions are more complex than reflexes, but less so than volitional action. This of course poses the question: what makes a particular level more or less complex? Here the key ingredient is probably flexibility: emotions can incorporate context and memory more so than reflexes, emotions persist over time, and emotions effectively decouple the inducing stimulus from the observed behavior. In the case of a reflex, there is a tight, rigid, and very stereotyped link between the sensory stimulus and the motor output. In the case of deliberated volitional action, this link is extremely flexible -so much so that it is typically impossible to describe the set of eliciting stimuli responsible for a person's actions. Emotions are somewhere in between these two extremes: like reflexes, they link stimuli to behavior in a fairly rigid fashion, but like volitional action they decouple stimuli from behavior to some extent.
In the case of volitional action, we typically cannot identify the specific ultimate sensory stimuli that are causally responsible for the action. Somebody might decide to begin reading a textbook, for example, in order to get a good grade in a class. What is the eliciting sensory stimulus? Instead of making a specific stimulus responsible, we typically refer to internal states of the person to explain actions: they are caused by beliefs, desires, and intentions. The same goes for emotional behavior: we could often identify a stimulus (he cried because his wife died), but often appeal to an internal state instead (he (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014) .
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Scalability: An emotion state can scale in intensity. Psychologically, this is often conceptualized as an arousal dimension. Importantly, parametric scaling can result in discrete behaviors, such as the transition from hiding to ßeeing during the approach of a predator.
Valence: A dimension that Darwin referred to in his Principle of Antithesis, valence is thought by many psychological theories to underlie an essence of emotion, often termed "core affect". Whereas scalability describes one fundamental aspect of behavior (whether to behave at all, and how vigorously), valence describes a second fundamental aspect: whether to approach or withdraw.
Persistence: An emotion state outlasts its eliciting stimulus, unlike reßexes, and so can inßuence cognition and behavior for some time.
Generalization: Emotions can generalize over stimuli and behaviors, making them much more ßexible than reßexes or Þxed-action patterns.
Priority over behavior control: Emotions are prepotent in control over behavior, requiring additional regulatory mechanisms to override their expression.
Poised for social communication:
Emotional behaviors, as a consequence of their priority over behavioral control, are typically honest signals of states that predict behavior. As such, they have been co-opted as signals that others (conspeciÞcs as well as predators and prey) can take advantage of. (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014). cried because he was sad). For emotions, either a stimulus-specific or a state-specific explanation usually works, because they occupy a level of explanation intermediate between that of reflexes and that of volitional actions. Indeed, emotions have often been thought of as "decoupled reflexes" in psychology (Scherer, 1994) .
2-D similarity structure Flexibility

Automaticity
The preliminary set of criteria listed in Table 1 , then, serves to describe the functional properties that characterize this "decoupled reflex" level of behavior. Several of the properties listed in the Table are worth noting. First, the two properties at the top, intensity and valence, have long been thought to define emotions. Indeed, dimensional theories of emotions usually focus on this two-dimensional space, since it turns out to capture much of the variance in people's ratings of emotions (Greenwald et al., 1989; Russell, 1980) . To some degree, different emotions can be distinguished by their location in this 2-D space -but this only works very coarsely, and a more fine-grained distinction would require adding additional dimensions, such as persistence and other attributes.
Indeed, persistence and generalization are two other features of emotion that once again emphasize that emotions are more than just reflexes or fixed-action patterns, since they are far more flexible. Yet, emotions are not as flexible as volitional action and occupy a peculiar role in how they can compete with volitional action for the control of behavior. That is, emotions are in some sense more automatic and prepotent: in the absence of thinking further about what to do, an emotional state will drive behavior. As is typical in evolution, many layers of modulation and control have evolved to regulate how emotion can drive behavior, and in adult humans this is certainly very complex, and very prominent (so much so that it is often difficult to tell somebody's emotion state just from watching their behavior -babies and animals are easier in that respect).
Future Challenges
The framework sketched above is indeed just a sketch. It by no means amounts to a theory of emotion, but I believe it gives a constructive starting point for developing such a theory. Here is a brief view of how open questions about emotions could be approached from this framework.
How is emotion different from other
states, such as attention or memory? The list of criteria in Table 1 , when further fleshed out, should provide some such distinction.
2.
How is emotion different from similar states, such as pain, hunger, or moods? Again, it would seem that one could list criteria -or one could subsume all these under a broader category of "emotion", depending on one's interest. Moods, for example, are typically longer lasting, but otherwise may be functionally similar to emotions. Pain and hunger are very narrowly linked to specific kinds of stimuli, and so look a bit more reflex-like in that respect, perhaps giving them a level intermediate between reflexes and emotions as we normally think of them.
3. How many different kinds of emotions are there? We have many, many words to describe our emotions, and these words also vary to some extent between different cultures, an important topic at the intersection of anthropology and psychology (e.g., (Wierzbicka, 1999) ). Many of these words are probably socially constructed concepts that are not ultimately useful for the scientist (unless she is an anthropologist) and that probably do not find counterparts in nonhuman animals. Paul Griffiths has suggested several different types of emotions: some, like Paul Ekman's "basic" emotions, are ones that respect useful distinctions the psychologist or neuroscientist wishes to make (Griffiths, 1997) . These are distinctions we would want to retain in a science of emotion. Others, like the socially constructed emotions, make distinctions that are not scientifically useful or principled. So I do believe it is the case that many words for emotions denote concepts that are not going to be part of a science of emotion -but this does not mean we have to throw out all emotions! 4. How does conscious experience of emotion fit in? Finally, at the end of a science of emotion, the scientist should be able to explain how conscious experience of emotions fits in. As I have been urging in this paper, we do not want to build in conscious experience as a pre-requisite for emotion. But on the other hand, there is little doubt that we (and probably many other animals) have conscious experiences of emotion. So eventually we would want to have an account of how this arises, what it contributes functionally, and how emotional experiences are distinguished from other kinds of experiences. That will be a long quest, but I fully agree that the question remains important, and that conscious experience of emotion is a valid phenomenon that eventually requires explanation.
